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INTRODUCTION

Recent attempts to use the Alien Tort Statute1 (Statute) in litigation
against foreign citizens2 and against United States citizens' have required international lawyers to interpret the words "tort

. .

. committed

in violation of the law of nations." 4 The theory underlying some of these
attempts, if accepted, would effectively turn United States federal courts
into courts of general international jurisdiction. Congress could hardly
have intended such a remarkable result. This situation raises the question, however, of just what Congress did intend. The most likely answer
is that Congress meant to grant federal jurisdiction over cases in which
an individual has committed a tortious act in the United States which, if
unredressed, would result in international legal responsibility on the part
of the United States.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1970, Stanford University; J.D.
1974, University of Michigan.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."
2. E.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. E.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985).
4. See supra note 1.
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II. THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST CONGRESS
It is unlikely that the First Congress, which originally passed the
Alien Tort Statute, had suits against nations in mind when it drafted the
Statute. Congressmen of the time must have considered both foreign
states 5 and the United States' to be immune from suit. Congress therefore somehow contemplated that individual defendants could be liable for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations. How?
Congress may have enacted the Alien Tort Statute to extend federal
jurisdiction to private rights under certain bodies of the law which were,
but are no longer, governed by the law of nations. In 1789 the "law of
nations" was widely viewed as including not only public international
law, as it does today, but also such legal fields as the law merchant
and maritime law.' While Congress may have originally intended the
"tort ... committed in violation of the law of nations" language to apply
to private rights of action under the law merchant or maritime law as
international bodies of law, subsequent developments have made clear
that courts must base any private rights of action in these areas of the
law on either state or federal domestic law. Thus, at least since the demise of Swift v. Tyson," there has been no federal common law, much
less international law, generally governing commercial rights and obligations.8 In addition, at least since The Lottawanna,10 maritime law,
though derived from international law and constituting uniform federal

5. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). But see
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987),
in which the Second Circuit-relying on secondary authority-recently held that international law has now evolved to the point that "sovereigns are not immune from suit for
their violations of international law." This conclusion is questionable at best.
The purpose of foreign sovereign immunity is to avoid the international friction caused
by allowing the courts of one state to sit in judgment on the governmental actions of
another. While this policy may be relatively weak when minor domestic law torts are
involved, the policy applies most strongly when one state is asserted to have violated the
public international law rights of another. Such cases are best resolved at the international diplomatic level. See Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 TUL. L.
REV. 776, 827-30 (1983).
6. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 425 (argument of the U.S. Attorney General), 429-48 (Iredell, J., dissenting), 468-69 (Cushing, J., concurring), 478
(Jay, C.J., concurring) (1793).
7. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the National Law of the United States
(pt. 1), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27-29 (1952).
8. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the National Law of the United States
(pt. 2), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792, 795-803 (1952).
10. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874).
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law, is applied in United States courts as domestic law, subject to legislative and even judicial modification within the United States.1 1 If Congress originally intended the Alien Tort Statute to provide jurisdiction
for private rights of action founded in bodies of the law of nations other
than public international law, such as maritime law and the law
merchant, the statute could have been meaningful when passed, although
today the statute would extend jurisdiction to a class of cases which simply no longer exists.
The fact that the Alien Tort Statute also refers to violation of "a
Treaty of the United States,"1 2 however, suggests that Congress intended
to include violations of public international law, that is, violations of the
legal obligations of one state to another. If so, how can the action of an
individual result in the violation of such an obligation? The most obvious
answer is where an individual is acting as an agent of the state. States
act through their officers, and any violation of a state's obligations is
necessarily an act or omission of at least one human being. This possibility gives rise to the sovereign immunity problem again, however. An official acting on behalf of a government would be immune from suit unless
his action was ultra vires or outside the scope of his duties; but in such a
case he would no longer be the agent of the government. As Judge (now
Justice) Scalia reasoned:
It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal
courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally
against present or former Executive officers, actions that are, concededly
and as a jurisdictionalnecessity, official actions of the United States.13
It is possible, however, for actions of nonagents to result in violations
of the international law obligations of a state. First, actions by officers of

11. See Dickinson, supra note 9, at 803-16.
12. See supra note 1.
13. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in
original). Of course, the Supreme Court has used a fiction to avoid this problem in suits
against officers of States of the Union under the fourteenth amendment. State action is
required as part of any allegation that the fourteenth amendment has been violated, but
sovereign immunity does not prevent suit on the theory that unconstitutional actions by
State officers are ultra vires. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The Supreme Court has recognized this as a fiction necessary to promote the supremacy of
federal law. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
It is unlikely that the First Congress intended a similar fiction for nonconstitutional
rights. See Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 116 (fiction not extended for suits alleging violations
of state laws). The Sanchez-Espinoza court rejected such a fiction for suits against
United States officers but reserved judgment with respect to officers of foreign governments. 770 F.2d at 207 n.5.
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political subdivisions result in international responsibility."" In addition,
actions of purely private individuals may result in international responsibility. Suppose a private mob lynched an alien without the governmental
protection owed under international law.' 5 Or suppose a diplomat, entitled to protection from private attacks by the receiving state, is inadequately protected.' In such cases the actions of private individuals can
result in international responsibility. Of course, it is the omissions of
officials upon which the responsibility of the state is theoretically based,
but it is fair to say that the individual's action was "in violation of international law."
In contrast, to say that commission of an "international" crime, for
instance piracy, is "in violation of international law" makes no sense.
Committing the crime does not result in a violation of one state's obligations to another.' 7 Indeed, the High Seas Convention limits the definition
of piracy to acts "for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship."'" Unlike an attack on a diplomat, the act of piracy, without more, results in no international responsibility. The relevance of
piracy to international law is instead that an exercise of jurisdiction over
the pirate (or the pirate ship), which international law does not otherwise permit, is permitted.' 9 Accordingly, no international law violation
occurs to which the definition of piracy is relevant, unless piracy is ab-

14. See de Ar&haga, InternationalResponsibility, in

MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTER-

NATIONAL LAW § 9.13 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
15. See 6 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1026, at 837 (1906).

16. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 768-69 (1980).
17. This idea is hardly new. Professor Lenoir, for instance, explained over fifty years
ago,
Piracy is an offense against the municipal law; international law enters into the
matter condemning the practice and permitting the states to exercise jurisdiction
over piratical acts.
Lenoir, Piracy Cases in the Supreme Court, 25 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 532, 552 (1934-35).
18. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962), art. 15 [hereinafter High
Seas Convention].
19. See id., art. 22; 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 311, at 96768 (1906); 2 G. HACKWORTH,DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 203, at 681 (1941);
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6, at 649. As Professor Lenoir

stated,
International law may grant to any and every nation the right to take jurisdiction
over crimes committed upon the high seas, but only to that extent can international
law envisage the crime of piracy.
Lenoir, supra note 17, at 542.
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sent, and a state nonetheless exercises criminal jurisdiction.2"
Custom or treaties have recognized other crimes, such as slave trading," war crimes21 and airplane hijacking, 23 to be, like piracy, "universal," but what this means is that a state may try someone for such crimes
without the nexus otherwise required between the defendant and the trying state.24 The United States Constitution empowers Congress to define
and punish such crimes, and the Constitution does so in explicit terms:
"The Congress shall have Power ...To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of

20. For instance, in The Virginius, 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 311, at 967-68 (1906), Spanish authorities court-martialed and executed six Americans
in Cuba in 1873. The Americans had been passengers on a ship containing arms and
ammunition for an insurgency in Cuba. The United States maintained that the Americans' actions did not amount to piracy as defined under the law of nations. The United
States was, therefore, able to obtain an $80,000 indemnity from the Spanish government.
Under customary international law states may exercise criminal jurisdiction when the
crime occurred within the state's territory (territoriality principle), when the criminal is
a national of the state exercising jurisdiction (nationality principle), when the crime was
against the governmental functions of the state exercising jurisdiction, e.g., counterfeiting
money (protective principle), or when the crime is one against mankind in general, e.g.,
piracy or war crimes (universality principle). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 10-19 (1965); Empson, The Application
of Criminal Law to Offenses Committed Outside the Jurisdiction,6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32
(1967); Feller,JurisdictionOver Offenses with a ForeignElement, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 5, 17-34 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); [Harvard] Research in
International Law, Introductory Comment, Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM.
J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; Sarkar, The Proper
Law of Crime in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50, 50-76 (G.

Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965); Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
and JurisdictionFollowing Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in InternationalLaw, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 1087, 1089-1103 (1974).
American criminal courts impose these limits under the canon of construction that if
possible, courts should interpret statutes, including criminal statutes, to be consistent with
the international legal obligations of the United States. E.g., United States v. MarinoGarcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Columba-Colella, 604
F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979).
21. Harvard Research, supra note 20, at 569-70.
22. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM., 15 LAW REP. OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 26 (1949). See also Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 298-304 (Supreme Court of Israel sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1962); Carnegie, Jurisdiction over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 402
(1963).
23. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, arts. 1-2, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
24. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335 (1925).
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Nations." 2 It is also reasonable that Congress should incorporate the
international law definition of piracy in its criminal statute. 28 But this
does not imply that the act of piracy amounts to a violation of the law of
nations, since no public international responsibility occurs unless the
United States tries a foreigner for a crime committed abroad, with an
insufficient United States nexus, and a universal crime is not alleged.
To give another example, the issue in the famous Lotus case27 was not
whether the French merchant officer violated international law by
neglecting to supervise his ship, but whether Turkey violated international law by instituting criminal proceedings against the officer in Turkey. If we change the facts so that a French citizen committed acts of
piracy instead of neglect against the Turkish vessel, and he was being
tried instead by Greece, the issue would be whether Greece would violate international law by instituting criminal proceedings against the
Frenchman. The answer would be "no" under the principles of international law relating to piracy, but this does not mean that the Frenchman's actions "violated international law" any more than the actions of
the French ship officer in Lotus.
The difference between universal crimes and individual actions resulting in violations of international law is, therefore, not one of degree-like points on a spectrum-but one of kind-like apples and oranges. Recognizing the difference helps to analyze the two alternative
interpretations of the Alien Tort Statute that Judge Edwards suggested28
in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republi.
Adopting his interpretation of Filartigav. Pena-Irala, Judge Edwards
argued that the Alien Tort Statute "provides a right to sue for alleged

25. U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
10.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1651. As the United States Attorney General successfully argued
in 1820,
[T]here is no defect in the definition of piracy, by the authorities to which we are
referred [i.e., the law of nations] by this act. The definition given by them is certain, consistent, and unanimous; and pirates, being hostes humani generis, are

punishable in the tribunalsof all nations. All nations are engaged in a league

against them, for the mutual defence and safety of all. This renders it the more fit
and proper, that there should be a uniform rule as to the definition of the crime,
which can only be drawn from the law of nations, as the only code universally
known and recognised by the people of all countries.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 156 (1820) (argument of the Attorney
General) (some emphasis added).
27. S.S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 26 (Sept. 7).
28. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
29. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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violations of the law of nations.""0
But how far can we take this? Suppose Japan and Korea by custom
have agreed to permit their citizens to compete economically on equal
terms in the territory of the other."' If a city official in Korea refuses a
pawnshop license to a Japanese citizen, and the Korean official later
takes a vacation in the United States, should the Japanese citizen be able
to sue the Korean in United States court? It is inconceivable that the
First Congress intended to extend United States federal jurisdiction (not
to mention a substantive right of action) to correct such entirely foreign
activity.3 2
Implicitly recognizing this difficulty, Judge Edwards would limit his
first Alien Tort Statute formulation to cases where the defendant is hostis humanis generis-an enemy of all mankind. 3 He relies upon piracy
and slave trading as offenses that "held a special place in the law of
nations: their perpetrators, dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to prosecution by any nation capturing them."'" But we have seen
that because committing a "universal" or "international" crime permits
any nation to prosecute without violation of international law, it does not
follow that such a crime constitutes a violation of international law itself.
There is, therefore, no sense in interpreting the notion "committed in
violation of the law of nations" as somehow limited to international
crimes. International crimes are not simply violations of public international law that are particularly egregious. They are not necessarily violations of public international law at all, but rather, instances where prosecution does not violate such law.
Thus, Judge Edwards' first formulation of the meaning of the Alien

30. 726 F.2d at 780. Judge Edwards relied on an opinion of the United States Attorney General to the effect that the Alien Tort Statute provides not only a forum but also
"a right of action." But the 1907 statement of the Attorney General, 26 Op. Att'y Gen.
250, 252 (1907), that "existing statutes provide a right of action and a forum" precedes a
citation not only to what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1350, but also the diversity jurisdiction
statute, now 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The diversity jurisdiction statute clearly provides no substantive cause of action, and one cannot read the Opinion of the Attorney General to find
a private right of action in § 1350 any more than in § 1332.
31. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). The international legal
obligation at issue in Asakura was a treaty obligation, but there is no reason that a court
could not derive such an obligation from custom. In any event, the binding nature of a
treaty is established by virtue of customary law, and the law of nations requires, therefore, compliance with a treaty.
32. Even if it were conceivable, it is curious that Congress would extend such protection just to aliens.
33. 726 F.2d at 781.
34. Id.
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Tort Statute cannot be correct. It is absurdly broad unless one interprets
the term "committed in violation of the law of nations" as limited to a
category of cases-crimes-defined by international law for entirely different purposes. The categories rarely even overlap,3 5 and the First Congress can hardly have contemplated such a limit.
Judge Edwards' alternative formulation of the meaning of the Alien
Tort Statute, in contrast, fits well the idea that an individual action is
"committed in violation of the law of nations" when it may directly result in international responsibility. He suggests that the statute "may be
read to enable an alien to bring a common law tort action in federal
court without worrying about jurisdictional amount or diversity, as long
as a violation of international law is also alleged.""8 The obvious intent
.of the First Congress in passing the Judiciary Act of 1789 was to allocate jurisdiction between state and federal courts. It made sense to put
cases affecting the international legal responsibility of the nation in the
federal courts, if they would otherwise be tried in state courts:
[If the court] appears to condone the original wrongful act, under the law
of nations the United States would become responsible for the failure of its
courts and be answerable not to the injured alien but to his home state. A
private act, committed by an individual against an individual, might
thereby escalate into an international confrontation."7
The Alien Tort Statute might apply if, for instance, a local sheriff
incarcerated an alien overnight in violation of customary international
law or treaty, and the alien sued the official in his individual capacity for
false imprisonment under state law. Another example, perhaps easier to
contemplate in 1789,11 would be if an individual assaulted a foreign am-

35. Physical attack on diplomats may be an example of an action that results in
international responsibility, as well as an example of a universal crime. See Respublica v.
De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (Phila. 0. & T. 1784); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S.
No. 8532. But other recognized universal crimes like piracy and slave trading presuppose
private activity. Other suggested violations of the public international law of human
rights, such as murder of individuals (see 726 F.2d at 781), are not universal crimes
when committed by private persons. Thus, for Judge Edwards to doubt that non-official
torture is a universal crime, 726 F.2d at 795, is perfectly consistent with the Second
Circuit's acceptance of the view of the United States government in Filartigathat official
torture is a violation of customary international law. 630 F.2d at 884.
36. 726 F.2d at 782.
37. Id. at 783.
38. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (Phila. 0. & T.

1784).
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bassador, and the ambassador sued in tort for the assault under state
law. Such cases could affect adversely the interests of the federal government in its conduct of foreign affairs. If the jurisdictional amount requirement could not be met, diversity jurisdiction would be unavailable.
A state court, less attuned to the international implications of the state
law tort suit, might not adequately protect the federal interest. The
Alien Tort Statute would solve this problem if interpreted to place jurisdiction in the federal courts to adjudicate the state tort claim.
The logic of this interpretation suggests its limits. If we assume that
Congress wanted to protect the international relations of the federal government, it was sensible to extend federal court jurisdiction only to individual actions which might result in international responsibility on the
part of the United States. The words of the statute, "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States," suggest this
limit. Clearly Congress was concerned with the international law obligations of the United States and not of other countries.
Second, the fact that the statute provides jurisdiction only when suit is
brought "by an alien" suggests strongly that the tort must occur within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 9 "Alien" presumably
means a non-United States national. But a non-United States national is
only an "alien" when he or she is away from his or her state of nationality. A Frenchman is an "alien" in the United States, but a native in
France.
Thus, one can logically interpret the Alien Tort Statute to grant federal jurisdiction when an individual commits a tortious act in the United
States which, if unredressed, would result in international legal responsibility on the part of the United States. Whether the act is a crime subject
to universal jurisdiction is irrelevant.
Judge Edwards suggested different limitations on his alternative theory. In his view, the statute should be
construed to cover actions by aliens for domestic torts that occur in the
territory of the United States and injure "substantial rights" under inter39. But see Randall, FederalJurisdictionOver InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 59-69 (1985).
A 1795 Opinion of the United States Attorney General also appears inconsistent with
this limitation. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795). The Attorney General stated that victims of
acts of hostility committed by American citizens in the British Colony of Sierra Leone
had a remedy under the Alien Tort Statute. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 59. This opinion is fully
consistent with the other suggested limitation, however, that the Alien Tort Statute is
limited to cases involving the international responsibility of the United States. The Attorney General relied, in fact, upon a treaty of amity between Britain and the United
States.
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national law, . . ., or for universal crimes, . . ., or for torts committed by
American citizens abroad, where redress in American courts might preclude international repercussions.40
I have already discussed the irrelevance of whether an action is a "universal crime." In addition, the problem with these limits, as Judge
Bork's concurrence ekplained, is that they bear little relation to the
words or probable purpose of the act:
Aside from the unguided policy judgments which these definitions require,
and whatever else may be said of them, it is clear that these limitations are
in no way prescribed, or even suggested, by the language of section 1350.
Rather, they are imposed upon that language for reasons indistinguishable
from ordinary legislative prudence."
This is basically the only criticism Judge Bork had of Judge Edwards'
alternative theory. When one substitutes the limits suggested previously,
which the language of section 1350 clearly does suggest, for the limits
Judge Edwards suggested, however, his "alternative interpretation" becomes immune from Judge Bork's extensive separation of powers
42
considerations.
One should note that the above analysis is not inconsistent with the
ideas that (1) individuals have rights under public international law, (2)
public international law may regulate a state's treatment of its own citizens (human rights law), or (3) the content of public international law,
as referred to in the Alien Tort Statute, has expanded and developed
since 1789.
First, saying that international crimes are not violations of international law is relevant only to the question of who has duties under public
international law, and not who has rights. A state may have an obligation not to treat an individual, an alien for instance, in a certain way.
We can say that the individual has rights under international law, or we
can use the traditional fiction that the individual's state has rights "in
respect of" the individual. But either way, it is a state that has the obligation, and any individual obligation under public international law, by
definition, results from an obligation of the state.43

40. 726 F.2d at 788.
41.

Id. at 821.

42. See id. at 801-08, 810-22.
43.

This is true even in the case of war crimes tried by international tribunals. In his

criticism of Judge Bork's Tel-Oren opinion, Professor D'Amato appeared not to recognize the distinction when he stated:

The argument that nearly all rules of international law are addressed to states
and not individuals is another way of saying that individuals are not members of

1988]

ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Second, it is. perfectly consistent to hypothesize the development of
human rights law without deeming universal crimes to be violations of
international law. Conceptually, if a state can owe international obligations to aliens or to foreign states in respect of aliens, it can similarly
owe international obligations to its own citizens, or to foreign states in
respect of its own citizens."' Whether the development of such customary
human rights law has actually occurred is another question.45 Such a
development is analytically distinct, however, from the "universal crime"
issue of whether a state can try persons for certain offenses without violating that state's international obligations.
Third, the very fact that the development of human rights law is possible demonstrates that the notion of international crimes not being violations of international law is fully consistent with the possibility that the
law of nations referred to in the Alien Tort Statute can expand and
develop. Of course, the terms of the statute limit its application to suits
by aliens, so it cannot apply to suits involving United States international
obligations to its own citizens, but certainly nothing prevents the development of additional international law protections for aliens.
In conclusion, the Alien Tort Statute is far from meaningless, although Congress obviously did not intend it to turn United States federal
courts into courts for the resolution of international law assertions
against other foreign nations. An understanding of the difference between international crimes and violations of international law strongly
supports a modified version of Judge Edwards' alternative interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute.
III.

SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS

It may be appropriate to anticipate the counterarguments of those who
urge a much broader reading of the Alien Tort Statute. Professor
Anthony D'Amato, for instance, has criticized Judge Bork's concurrence
the class of litigants that may appropriately invoke the power of the court ....

D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 92, 98 (1985). Many rules concerning states obviously protect individuals (e.g.,
customary law protecting aliens), and there is no logical inconsistency with permitting
the individual to invoke such protection in a particular forum. In other words, it is perfectly consistent to say that international law rules are addressed to states but that individuals may be members of a class of litigants that can rely upon such law for certain
purposes in court.
44. See D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1147-48 (1982).
45. See Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human
Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609.
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in Tel-Oren.'6 Judge Bork argued in Tel-Oren that the Alien Tort Statute should be given a limited interpretation because of the same separation of powers concerns that underlie the political question and act of
state doctrines.4" These arguments are simply not necessary to support a
limited reading of the Alien Tort Statute. The language and context of
the Alien Tort Statute support its interpretation as a grant of federal
jurisdiction to certain suits that could otherwise be brought in state court.
There is no separation of powers issue at all, but rather a federalism
issue. In other words, the Alien Tort Statute, like the rest of the Judiciary Act of 1789, allocates power between the federal courts and the state
courts, not between the federal courts and the federal executive. As indicated, 48 none of Judge Bork's separation of powers concerns are adversely affected by permitting suits that otherwise could be brought in
state court to be brought in federal court.
Accordingly, much of the criticism of Judge Bork's opinion would
simply miss the mark if directed toward the natural interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute suggested here. For instance, Judge Bork's opinion
has been criticized as precluding any application of the Alien Tort Statute to an alien suing for a tort.4 As explained above, the Alien Tort
Statute applies to a clearly defined, if somewhat limited, class of cases.5"
Advocates of a broader interpretation, however, might not only reject
Judge Bork's separation of powers argument, but might also argue the
opposite-that is, public policy affirmatively supports the general principle that the judiciary should determine international law issues. One
might, perhaps uncharitably, call this a mixture of powers principle. Of
course, even if this remarkable idea were accepted, it would not mean
that Congress intended the Alien Tort Statute to further such a policy.
The 1789 Judiciary Act, of which the Alien Tort Statute was a part,
allocated jurisdiction between state and federal courts, and Congress can
hardly have intended it to expand judicial power vis-i-vis the executive.
In any event, one can easily deal with the policy argument on the
merits. Determining international law issues means, in effect, determining whether the United States or a foreign state has violated international law. Such a determination affects, at least indirectly, the conduct
of foreign affairs.
If a court states that the United States executive has violated interna-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

D'Amato, supra note 43.
726 F.2d at 801-08, 810-22.
See supra text accompanying note 42.
D'Amato, supra note 43, at 98.
See supra text accompanying note 38.

1988]

ALIEN TORT STATUTE

tional law, other nations may have difficulty knowing who speaks for the
United States. In addition, since countries must comply with international law as a part of the conduct of foreign relations in general, the
reasons for allocating the conduct of foreign relations to the President
support giving the political branches the final word as to how the United
States will comply with international law. To protect the interests, indeed the survival, of the nation, the government must be able to act in
the international arena with speed, often with secrecy, and with the benefit of sophisticated, broad-based, often secret, information. It is unwise
to have courts-without the benefit of a full comprehension of the factors
leading to the decision in question-make the final determination of the
international legality of the actions of the United States.
Thus, on behalf of the unanimous Supreme Court of the United
States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in interpreting the Alien Tort
Statute, stated that "it is impossible for the courts to declare an act a tort
of that kind [i.e., in violation of the law of nations] when the Executive,
Congress and the treaty-making power all have adopted the act."'" The
political branches, in other words, have the final say as to whether the
United States has violated international law.
If a United States court holds that a foreign nation, on the other hand,
has violated international law, there is again the potential problem that
the United States is not speaking with one voice. As Justice Harlan explained in great detail in the Sabbatino case, when the courts decide
controversial issues of international law, "whatever way the matter is
cut, the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive
Branches could hardly be avoided."5 2 The Supreme Court has relied on
the constitutional policy that the nation speak with one voice not only in
its exposition of the Act of State Doctrine in Sabbatino, but also in applying the political question doctrine53 and in interpreting the foreign
commerce clause54 and the export-import clause. 5
The policy of having the United States speak with one voice in foreign
affairs does not mean that courts may never apply international law. On
the contrary, in certain types of cases a determination of international
law is highly relevant. First, courts should-if possible-interpret statutes as consistent with international law.55 Second, where federal courts
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O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433 (1964).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452-53 (1979).
Washington Rev. Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn., 435 U.S. 734, 752-53 (1978).
See supra note 20. Some courts have also used international law to inform consti-
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have jurisdiction over a dispute between parties but neither the legislative nor the executive branch has provided a substantive basis for resolv57
ing the dispute, international law is an appropriate source of law.
Third, Congress may incorporate customary international law by statutory reference.58 Each of these possibilities is consistent with the idea
that the United States speak with one voice in foreign affairs, if only for
the reason that in each case Congress can legislate substantively to the
contrary if it wishes.
Of course with the Alien Tort Statute, Congress has incorporated customary international law by reference; the question is, in order to do
what? Considerations of "speaking with one voice" are fully consistent
with interpreting the Alien Tort Statute to incorporate international law
for purposes of allocating state and federal court jurisdiction. The policy
is arguably not consistent with interpreting the Alien Tort Statute to
permit litigation, for instance, of alien claims based on violations of the
international law obligations of third states. At the very least we can be
sure, however, that there is no mixture of powers policy that affirmatively supports general commitment of customary international law issues to the courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Does any argument favor a broad interpretation of the Alien Tort
Statute? If I had to make such an agreement, I suppose I would try to
cloud the difference between universal crimes and violations of international law. One way to do this would be to focus on those crimes that are
also violations of the obligations of one state to another. For instance, an
attack on a diplomat may be both a violation of international law (i.e.,
failure to prevent or punish the attack may result in international responsibility by the territorial state to the sending state) and a universal
crime (i.e., a third state could try the perpetrator).59 The same argument
could be made with respect to counterfeiting. Some states have asserted
universal jurisdiction over the crime of counterfeiting, ° although courts

tutional interpretation. E.g., Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
granted sub nom. Boss v. Barry, 55 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Feb. 23, 1987).
57. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900). See also Rogers, Applying the InternationalLaw of Sovereign Immunity to
the States of the Union, 1981 DUKE L.J. 449.
58. E.g., United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).

59. See supra note 35.
60.

Harvard Research, supra note 20, at 570. See supra note 20.,
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will, in most cases, classify the jurisdiction more accurately as protective.61 The Supreme Court has held, however, that the United States has
the obligation to suppress counterfeiting of foreign currency in the
United States.62 If so, one could say that the counterfeiter (a) committed
an international crime, and (b) acted so as to result in a violation of the
international obligations of the United States.
But this, again, is not to say that the existence of an international
crime necessarily implies an individual action resulting in international
law violations. There just happens to be overlap. Certainly crimes are
not automatically violations of international law, unless perhaps states
with a right to prosecute certain criminals necessarily also have a duty to
prosecute such criminals. But there is no reason why this should be so.
There is, for instance, no widely accepted obligation to prosecute pirates.
Lauterpacht flatly states that the law of nations does not make it a duty
"for every maritime state to punish all pirates,"6 3 and the negotiators of
the 1958 High Seas Convention rejected such a duty. 4
While there may be some overlap, international crimes are distinct
from individual actions that result in international law violations. An
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute that would result in United
States court determinations of all international obligations of foreign
states is impossibly broad. Trying to limit the statute to "crimes" is mix-

61. That is, State A may try a nonnational who committed the crime outside of State
A's territory, but only if the defendant is accused of counterfeiting the currency or instruments of State A. See Harvard Research, supra note 20, at 440; United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1961); International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Apr.
20, 1929, art. 9, 112 L.N.T.S. 371.
62. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887). The Court held that a federal
statute could constitutionally criminalize the counterfeiting of banknotes of foreign states
by virtue of the Congressional power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Currently, courts could justify the same result

under the Commerce Clause or the foreign affairs power. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 323 n.26 (1972).
63. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1955); see
also A. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION
226 n.32 (1912).
64. The negotiators of the High Seas Convention rejected an Albanian-Czechoslovak
proposal that articles 38 through 43 be replaced by a single article reading, "All States
are bound to take proceedings against and to punish acts of piracy, as defined by present
international law, and to co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of

piracy." IV U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Second Committee, 11 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 9) at 78, 84, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.46 (1956), reprintedin 4 M.
WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

661 (1968).
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ing apples and oranges. A meaningful jurisdictional interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute is the logical alternative.

